We investigate whether municipal financial managers experience turnover surrounding accounting restatements. The evidence suggests that municipalities disclosing accounting restatements are more likely to see changes in the top financial manager position than a control sample of non-restatement municipalities. Overall, our findings are consistent with citizens and/or municipal leaders understanding the adverse consequences associated with accounting failures, and taking corrective action following their disclosure.
INTRODUCTION
An extensive corporate sector literature investigates the consequences faced by managers of firms disclosing accounting restatements. For example, several studies find that restatements are associated with higher executive turnover (e.g. Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, and Dalton 2006; Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins 2006; Hennes, Leone, and Miller 2008; Collins, Masli, Reitenga, and Sanchez 2009; Burks 2010 ) and lower executive bonus/option compensation (e.g. Collins, Reitenga, and Sanchez 2008; Cheng and Farber 2008; Burks 2010) following their disclosure. These findings imply that corporate boards of directors impose labor market penalties on top executives associated with financial reporting failures.
In the government sector, studying the implications of accounting failures such as restatements is important because financial reporting helps stakeholders assess how public resources are acquired and used (GASB 2006) . When financial reporting is suspect, stakeholders could have difficulties assessing whether municipal officials have fulfilled their stewardship responsibility (Rich and Zhang 2014) . If citizens and/or elected officials view these accounting failures as costly, one consequence could involve changes in the financial leadership position. In this study, we investigate whether municipal accounting restatements are associated with turnover in the top financial manager position. 1 1 We use the term "financial manger" to identify the individual who takes primary responsibility for the financial reporting function. In practice, this includes titles such as "chief financial officer", "finance While municipal restatements occur at a non-trivial rate (Baber, Gore, Rich, and Zhang 2013) , it is not clear, ex ante, whether municipal managers will face increased levels of turnover following accounting failures. On one hand, evidence from Baber et al. (2013) highlights that municipalities face higher interest costs following the disclosure of a restatement, implying they are costly events in terms of external financing.
Furthermore, calls for reforms similar to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the public sector (Frank and Fink 2008; GFOA 2008 ) signal a push towards more robust governance structures, which should be better positioned to evaluate the performance of financial managers. Alternately, given that job security is an important factor in deciding to work for government (Lewis and Frank 2002) , and questions regarding the importance of financial reporting in a political context (Zimmerman 1977) , it is plausible that malfeasance greater than an accounting failure is required to elicit measurable differences in turnover among individuals in top finance positions.
We perform our analysis using a sample of 138 municipalities with a population of at least 50,000 citizens during the period 2001 through 2004. Our findings suggest that municipalities revealing accounting restatements are more likely to experience financial manager turnover than a control sample of non-restatement municipalities in the period surrounding their disclosure. Therefore, our results are consistent with the assertion that citizens and/or municipal leaders understand the adverse consequences of restatements, and take corrective actions following their disclosure.
We contribute to the municipal accounting literature in at least two ways. First, we extend work by Baber et al. (2013) addressing the consequences of poor financial director", and "director of financial reporting", and is typically hired or appointed (Smith and Kupierz 2014). reporting in the municipal context. Our findings are consistent with municipalities looking to take actions that signal high quality financial reporting in the future following restatements. Second, our study focuses on the financial managers that are responsible for the integrity of municipal financial reporting. While there has been research on factors associated with city manager turnover (Feiock and Stream 1998; Watson and Hassett 2003) , there is limited evidence on the factors associated with changes in the top municipal financial manager position.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. We first present a literature review that includes a background on the restatement and managerial turnover literatures, before an outline of our hypothesis. Our sample selection procedures and methodology are presented next, followed by a discussion of the results. The last section provides concluding remarks.
PRIOR LITERATURE

Restatements background
An accounting restatement is an acknowledgement of an error or omission in prior year financial statements (Abbott, Parker, and Peters 2004) . Existing research finds a series of adverse consequences for firms disclosing restatements -including negative abnormal returns on the date of the restatement announcement (Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz 2004) , higher costs of capital (Hribar and Jenkins 2004) , a decline in the information content of earnings (Wilson 2008) , and tighter loan contract terms for corporate debt (Graham, Li, and Qiu 2008) . One common explanation for these results is that investors are more skeptical regarding financial information following revelation of an accounting failure, and therefore demand a risk premium as compensation.
Existing research also provides support for the conclusion that firms make structural changes following accounting failures. For example, Farber (2005) finds that firms facing SEC enforcement actions strengthen their governance systems in terms of board composition and audit committee oversight following the event. Furthermore, Chen, Elder, and Hung (2014) find that firms experiencing negative market reactions to restatements report their financial statements more conservatively following the restatement announcement.
Despite prior studies in the corporate sector, relatively little empirical research considers the determinants and consequences of restatements in the municipal sector. One exception is Baber et al. (2013) , who document that over half of a sample of 207 municipalities experienced at least one restatement between 2001 and 2004. Furthermore, Baber et al. (2013) provide evidence suggesting that restatements elicit adverse financial consequences for localities, in that restatement municipalities face debt costs that are 35 basis points higher than control municipalities in the post-restatement time period. This latter finding is consistent with municipal bond investors identifying disclosure of a restatement as a significant event that leads to re-examination of information risk stemming from financial information.
Corporate executive turnover
A mature literature explores factors associated with executive turnover in the corporate sector. For example, several studies investigate associations between CEO turnover and measures of accounting and stock-price performance (Coughlan and Schmidt 1985; Warner, Watts, and Wruck; 1988; Murphy and Zimmerman 1993) .
Furthermore, existing research examines the role played by governance mechanisms in executive turnover (Weisbach 1988; Goyal and Park 2002; DeFond and Hung 2004; Hazarika, Karpoff, and Nahata 2012) . One general interpretation of the findings from these studies is that CEOs of poorly performing firms are more likely to turnover, and that the likelihood of such turnover increases with the strength of a firm's corporate governance structure.
In the context of financial reporting failures, the extant literature supports the conclusion that top executives of publicly traded firms face labor market penalties following restatement disclosures. For example, Arthaud-Day et al. (2006) suggest that both CEOs and CFOs of restatement firms are more than twice as likely to turn over compared to non-restatement firms. Additionally, Desai et al. (2006) find that 60% of restatement firms have at least one senior manager (CEO, chairman, or president) lose their job within 24 months of the announcement, compared to only 35% for a control sample. Lastly, Hennes et al. (2008) provide evidence highlighting that both CEOs and CFOs experience high levels of turnover following restatements reflecting "irregularities", suggesting that boards of directors are willing to take drastic action against executives involved in intentional misreporting.
The corporate evidence is not limited to top executives, however, as Srinivasan (2005) shows that the audit committee members of firms disclosing accounting restatements are more likely to lose their board positions both at the restating firm and at other firms where they hold directorships. In a similar vain, Fich and Shivdasani (2007) highlight that the outside directors of firms facing class action lawsuits alleging financial misrepresentation experience a decline in other outside directorships following the suit.
Finally, Hennes et al. (2014) show that firms are more likely to dismiss their financial statement auditors following restatements. Taken together, these results imply that corporate boards also impose penalties on parties involved in the governance structures of firms associated with poor financial reporting outcomes.
Based on the premise that chief financial officers oversee financial reporting systems, studies that focus exclusively on CFOs also find that they suffer labor market consequences from restatements. Evidence from Collins et al. (2009) indicates that CFOs experience significant turnover after restatements, followed by a reduced ability to find comparable employment. This effect is even more pronounced in the post-SOX world, possibly because of increased scrutiny of the decisions made by financial managers (Burks 2010) . However, one factor unique to the corporate sector related to CFO turnover following restatements involves shareholder litigation. Collins et al. (2008) find that CFO turnover is associated with restatements, but only when the restating firm is the target of a class-action lawsuit.
Municipal executive turnover
There is also an extensive literature in public administration focused on the turnover of top executives in local government (DeHoog and Whitaker 1990; Whitaker and DeHoog 1991; Feiock and Stream 1998) . Research suggests that turnover of municipal government officials creates political uncertainty ) which can have negative consequences. For example, ) examine city borrowing patterns in the late 1980's, and show that turnover of council members and managers in council-manager cities is associated with greater municipal debt burdens. In addition, Clingermayer and Feiock (1997) Given the political and regulatory characteristics of governmental organizations that distinguish municipalities from the corporate sector (Vermeer, Raghunandan, and Forgione 2006) , the consequences of municipal restatements on labor markets are not obvious, ex ante. Therefore, whether and how accounting restatements relate to financial manager turnover is a question to resolve empirically.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Studies suggest boards of directors impose labor market penalties on executives (especially the chief executive and chief financial officers) associated with financial reporting failures (Arthaud-Day et al. 2006; Desai et al. 2006; Hennes et al. 2008; Collins et al. 2009; Burks 2010) . Furthermore, existing research also finds that executives receive lower bonus/option compensation (e.g. Collins et al. 2008; Cheng and Farber 2008; Burks 2010 ) following restatement disclosures, possibly as a penalty for sub-par performance, or as a strategy to reduce the incentives of executives to misreport reported earnings.
However, prior studies also suggest that there may not be labor market penalties for executives involved in financial reporting failures (Beneish 1999; Agrawal, Jaffe, and Karpoff 1999) . For example, Beneish (1999) finds that manager turnover is similar between firms that overstate earnings and in firms that do not. In addition, Agrawal et al.
(1999) do not find increased turnovers for senior managers or directors following revelation of fraud. Therefore, existing literature is somewhat mixed regarding penalties associated with restatements.
In local government, financial managers oversee the production of financial reports. As a result, these managers have a sophisticated "role as an organizational-wide conduit of information necessary to carry forward organizational tasks" (McCue and Gianakis 1997). Furthermore, based on Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA)'s Code of Professional Ethics, financial managers should "not knowingly sign, subscribe to, or permit the issuance of any statement or report which contains any misstatement or which omits any material fact." This means that financial managers commit to "prepare and present statements and financial information pursuant to applicable law and generally accepted practices and guidelines (http://www.gfoa.org/about-gfoa/code-professional-ethics)." While municipal restatements occur at a non-trivial rate (Baber et al. 2013) , it is not clear whether municipalities are in a position to discipline financial managers that oversee reporting failures. On one hand, calls for reforms similar to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the public sector (Frank and Fink 2008; GFOA 2008) highlight the possibility of governance structures that are in a position to adequately evaluate the performance of financial managers. Moreover, given that research suggests that municipalities experience adverse consequences from restatements in terms of greater interest costs (Baber et al. 2013 ), restatements potentially create incentives to take actions that signal high quality financial reporting in the future.
On the other hand, prior work suggests that financial reporting is not important in political markets (Zimmerman 1977) . Furthermore, given that job security is cited an important factor in deciding to work for government (Lewis and Frank 2002) , there is the possibility that a higher threshold of malfeasance over an accounting failure is necessary for removal of top financial managers. Finally, correcting a prior misstatement may be perceived as a positive rather than negative event (Baber et al. 2013 ) to the extent it accompanies improvements to the financial reporting system. Therefore, we present the following hypothesis (stated in null form).
Hypothesis:
Top financial manager turnover is independent of whether municipalities disclose accounting restatements.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Sample Selection
We begin with 4,244 municipalities that responded to a 2001 governance survey conducted by the International City/County Management Association (ICMA). In line with prior research (Copley et al. 1995; Baber et al. 2013; Rich and Zhang 2014) , we limit our analysis to localities with populations greater than 50,000 citizens, for a total of Following Palmrose et al. (2004) and Baber et al. (2013) , we identify accounting restatements when municipalities directly refer to restatements or prior period adjustments within their CAFR through either footnote disclosure or reference within the financial statements. We focus only on the first restatement for a given municipality during the sample period, and exclude restatements that result from implementations of GASB standards and retrospective reclassifications between funds. These procedures resulted in identification of restatements from 141 sample municipalities (56%).
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We identify top financial manager details for the two years prior to restatement through the year of the restatement from the transmittal letter within each municipality's CAFR, the ICMA Municipal Year Book (ICMA 2001 (ICMA , 2002 (ICMA , 2003 (ICMA , 2004 , or direct inquiry of finance department personnel. 3 This procedure allows for calculation of turnover in the year before restatement (year t-1) and the year of the restatement (year t).
We successfully identify top financial manager turnover details for 123 of the 141 restatement municipalities (87%). To create a control sample, we match each restatement municipality to the non-restatement municipality in the same state that is closest in population. Table 1 provides a summary of our sample selection procedures, which 2 Examination of restatements suggested a wide range of corrections ranging from fund re-classifications to error corrections. Approximately half of the restatements involved the balance sheet, where the most commonly impacted accounts were capital assets (25%), receivables (14%), and liabilities (14%). Furthermore, several restatements were quite large, with 13 involving amounts that were in excess of $100 per capita. 3 Note that our primary results hold if we limit our analysis to turnover identified exclusively from information in CAFRs.
resulted in 69 municipalities in both our restatement and control subsamples (138 municipalities total).
[ Table 1 
Model
We propose the following logit specification to investigate our hypothesis:
where Turnoveri,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 (else 0) representing whether a sample municipality experienced turnover in the top financial manager position in year t.
Restate_Cityi is an indicator variable coded as 1 (else 0) for restatement municipalities,
while Restate_Yeart is coded as 1 (else 0) for observations in the year of restatement. 4 Follow up procedures consist of additional mail requests and telephone calls to non-responding municipalities. 5 CAFRs are often released well after the fiscal year in question (Smith and Kupierz 2014) , with even the GFOA's Certificate of Achievement program only requiring issuance within six months of fiscal year end (Miller 2008) . Therefore, one consequence of our restatement identification methodology is that
Observations for the control sample in the pre-restatement period are reflected in the constant. The interaction term (Restate_Cityi x Restate_Yeart) represents the incremental impact of a restatement in the post-restatement period, which allows for difference-indifference analysis that compares top financial manager turnover for restatement versus control municipalities conditional on the timing of the restatement (Desai et al. 2006) .
Our model includes several control variables shown by prior research to relate to managerial turnover. Feng, We, Luo, and Shevlin (2011) suggest that CFOs of public firms engage in material accounting manipulation due to pressure from the chief executive. In the municipal setting, one potential source of pressure comes from a strong mayor who has re-election concerns. Support for this conclusion comes from Whitaker and Dehoog (1991), who find that city managers are more likely to turnover in cities with elected mayors. Therefore, we include Council manager form as an indicator variable equal to 1 (else 0) to identify municipalities that employ the council manager form of government, and predict a negative coefficient in our model. Next, Burks (2010) suggests that penalties imposed on CFOs in the post-SOX period are larger, and attributes this effect to additional duties imposed on audit committees. As a result, we include Audit committee as an indicator variable equal to 1 (else 0) for municipalities that have voluntarily formed an audit committee. We expect municipalities with audit committees to be more likely to take action against those responsible for the financial reporting system following an accounting failure, which would lead to a positive coefficient in our model.
announcement of a restatement in the financial statements likely occurs well after discovery of the underlying item requiring a restated value. guidelines for municipalities regarding timeliness and adherence to governmental reporting standards. One possibility is that participation in the program (which is voluntary) serves to comment on the integrity of financial managers in a way that tempers the labor market consequences of restatements. Therefore, we include GFOA certificate as an indicator variable equal to 1 (else 0) for municipalities receiving the certificate, and predict a negative coefficient in our model.
Prior work suggests that poor performance is associated with higher executive turnover generally (Warner et al. 1988; Murphy and Zimmerman 1993; Boyne, John, and Petrovsky 2010) , and following restatement disclosures (Desai et al. 2006; Burks 2010 ).
Therefore, we include Recent fiscal deficit as an indicator variable equal to 1 (else 0) for municipalities that reported at least one fiscal deficit (where expenditures exceed revenues) in the three years prior to restatement. Given that a fiscal deficit could imply poor financial performance, we predict a positive coefficient in our model. 6 Furthermore, we include Per capita debt through the log of total debt divided by population to consider the impact of financial flexibility, but make no directional prediction with respect to financial manager turnover.
We include the log of Population to control for municipality size. Large municipalities likely have more mature governance structures, leading to the possibility that they are better equipped to replace underperforming financial managers. Therefore, we predict a positive coefficient on Population in our model. Next, research by Feiock et al. (2001) suggests that growing municipalities retain top administrators. However, a plausible alternative is that financial managers of growing municipalities have value in the labor market, making them desirable candidates for positions at other municipalities.
As a result, we include Population growth, measured as the percentage increase in population for the municipality between 1990 and 2000, but make no prediction regarding associations with financial manager turnover. Reported standard errors are clustered on state using the method outlined by Rodgers (1993). Table 2 provides summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis.
PRIMARY RESULTS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Primary results
Column 1 provides mean and median values for restatement municipalities, column 2
shows statistics for control municipalities, and column 3 presents significance levels for tests of mean differences between the two subsamples. The results highlight that restatement municipalities are less likely to employ Big four auditors, and more likely to switch auditors than control municipalities. We note no differences in mean values for other variables between the restatement and non-restatement municipality subsamples.
[ Table 2 goes here] Table 3 provides 2 x 2 matrices summarizing interactions between restatements and top financial manager turnover in the year prior to restatement (Panel A) and year of restatement (Panel B). In the year prior to restatement, there is no evidence of a difference in turnover probability for financial managers of restatement versus control municipalities (9% versus 10%; χ 2 = 0.08, p-value = 0.77). However in the year of restatement disclosure, financial managers are significantly more likely to turnover than control municipalities (7% versus 23%; χ 2 = 6.80, p-value = 0.01). We take this as preliminary evidence that top financial managers experience high levels of turnover when they are affiliated with restatements.
[ Table 3 goes here]
We present results from our multivariate analysis of equation (1) in Table 4 , where the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 (else 0) when municipalities experience turnover in the top financial manager position in year t.
Column 1 includes only observations in the year of restatement, and the results suggest that restatement municipalities are significantly more likely to experience financial manager turnover (z-statistic = 2.23) than control municipalities. Examination of the odds ratio of 3.58 suggests that turnover is several times more likely for restatement compared to control municipalities in the year of the restatement. Column 2 includes observations for the year prior and year of restatement, and provides evidence similar to column 1.
Column 3 utilizes a difference-in-difference design, and provides further support for our hypothesis in that increased financial manager turnover surrounding restatements is concentrated in the post-restatement time period, as highlighted by the positive coefficient on Restate_City x Restate_Year (z-statistic = 1.74). Furthermore, the odds ratio of 2.92 suggests that turnover is much more likely in the post-restatement period.
We interpret these results as evidence that municipal financial managers face higher levels of turnover when they are associated with disclosure of an accounting failure.
Therefore, we reject the hypothesis that top financial manager turnover is independent of whether municipalities disclose accounting restatements.
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[ Table 4 goes here]
7 Variance inflation factor (VIF) of an OLS model of equation (1) (Burks 2010) .
Municipalities with multiple restatements
Our primary results focus on financial manager turnover surrounding the first restatement during our sample period, but it is noteworthy that several municipalities disclosed multiple restatements within our sample period. Of the 100 restatement municipalities without turnover surrounding their first restatement, 32 experienced a second restatement. Of these, 7 (22%) saw financial manager turnover in the year of the additional restatement. While this fraction is similar to the proportions for municipalities disclosing their first restatement as listed in Table 3 , it does not imply that there are greater consequences to financial managers disclosing multiple restatements.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study is to examine associations between governmental financial reporting failures and turnover of the managers that oversee the financial reporting process. This research is potentially helpful for regulators in deciding whether governance reforms similar to SOX in the public sector are appropriate (Reinstein, Abdolmohammadi, Tate, and Miller 2014) , and evaluating the stewardship role of the government officials (GASB 2006) . Our findings suggest that municipalities that disclose accounting restatements are more likely to experience finance director turnover than a control sample matched on state, size, and restatement year. Therefore, we interpret our results to be consistent with prior findings in the governmental sector that show consequences in the debt market for municipalities with financial accounting failures (Baber et al. 2013) .
From a public policy perspective, our study provides evidence on a potential disciplinary measure for financial managers in response to municipal restatements, which is something that has not been explored in prior literature. In terms of municipal governance policy, our study suggests that governments should consider adding the prevalence of accounting failures as an input in the evaluation of top financial managers.
Moreover, results from our study also aids organizations such as the GFOA in defining the characteristics of strong financial managers.
Our study is subject to limitations, however. First, the restatement and control sample consists of municipalities for which finance director details are available, and our sample draws from municipalities that responded to the ICMA Municipal Form of Government Survey. Thus, our findings may not generalize to a wider population of municipalities. Second, our study examines only restatements at the local level; future research could examine executive turnover and financial reporting failures at the statelevel. Finally, while we do not consider GASB 34 adjustments as restatements, our sample window includes a piece of the implantation period. If long-time finance directors view the implantation costs to be significantly higher than benefits (Del Vecchio, Johnson, and Magner 2007) , one consequence could be increased voluntary turnover that is unrelated to restatements. Even still, our study provides an important incremental step toward understanding the consequences of restatements on executives in the public sector. Audit committee is an indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for municipalities that have voluntarily formed an audit committee; Big four auditor is an indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for municipalities that employ an auditor that is a member of the Big 4 audit firms; Auditor switch is an indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for municipalities that switched auditors; Staggered council elections is an indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for municipalities with staggered council election cycles; GFOA certificate is an indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for municipalities that received the GFOA certificate of excellence in financial reporting; Recent fiscal deficit is an indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for municipalities that experienced at least one fiscal deficit in the 3 year window preceding the restatement year; Population is the number of citizens residing in a particular municipality; Population growth is the percentage change in population between 1990 and 2000; Per capita debt is total debt divided by population. Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses, with standard errors clustered on state following procedures outlined by Rogers (1993) .
This table presents estimates for a logit specification of equation (1), where the dependent variable is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the municipality experienced top financial manager turnover in year t (0 otherwise). Variable are defined in Table 2 , except for: Restate_City is an indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for restatement municipalities; Restate_Year is an indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) to denote observations in the year of restatement (for both restatement and control municipalities). Note that values for Population and Per capita debt are included at logged values.
